DALE DIXON
Dale Dixon in a blue blazer with a calm, skeptical look beside the words "Is your fear lying?" and The Presence Lab logo.

The Presence Lab · Season 5 · Episode 304

The Fear Check

Which fear deserves your attention? Say it, size it, steer it: a three-step check for leaders whose minds keep running to the worst case.

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On an ordinary Sunday, I stood in a very crowded church auditorium during worship, next to my wife. Everyone was standing, and I was tense. I was scanning the room. Where are the exits? Where is cover? My mind had built a worst-case scenario, a rare attack, and I was already working out how to protect her and get her to safety.

That probably sounds crazy to a lot of people. It comes from a lot of hours spent with first responders and years in the news business. Then I caught it. It was nine in the morning, in a place of worship, and I should have been focused on what mattered most in that moment, not on an event that hasn't happened and most likely won't. I kept singing, and I forced myself to focus on the words. My brain was hunting for a threat where the threat was minimal.

On the way home, I found out my wife had been thinking the same thing.

A rare attack is still real, and the families who have lived through one carry that loss every day. Nothing here is meant to shrink it. What I wanted to understand is what my own mind did, and what it can teach those of us who lead.

I came across a post that sits close to my Sunday. On October 26, Michael Easter, the author of The Comfort Crisis, published "Fear is Good" in his Two Percent newsletter. Partway through, he writes: "One theory suggests that when we become safer, we don't calm down. Instead, our brains may start to over-index on possible events that aren't truly dire." He offers it as one theory and says he will come back to it in a later post. Still, the sentence stayed with me, because my mind had been giving a rare event more attention than its odds had earned.

The short answer

The Fear Check: say it, size it, steer it.

  • Say it. Put the threat in one plain sentence. A sentence can be checked. A picture can't.

  • Size it. Find one number from a source with no reason to scare you, and set it beside a risk you already take.

  • Steer it. Hands open. Run it like the safety briefing before a flight. Where are the exits? What's my responsibility? Check. Now, engage in the moment.

The question to carry: Is this fear worth my attention?

Why does a leader's mind keep running to the worst case?

Mostly because a vivid picture beats a number. In 1978, Sarah Lichtenstein, Paul Slovic and their colleagues asked people how often different causes of death happen. People overestimated the rare causes and underestimated the common ones. The researchers traced the errors to exposure, memorability and imagination, and when people were told to avoid those biases, they couldn't. A rare attack in a crowded room is a picture I can run frame by frame, and the drive to church isn't. The vivid thing got my attention, and the common thing got none.

The legal scholar Cass Sunstein, then at the University of Chicago, studied the related effect. His 2002 Yale Law Journal essay opens with a New York Times report from the weeks after September 11: many people were forswearing air travel and buying gas masks and radiation detectors. His thesis is that when intense emotions are engaged, people tend to focus on the adverse outcome, not on its likelihood. In his words, people "do not give sufficient consideration to the likelihood that the worst case will actually occur." He calls it probability neglect, and for an individual he says it produces "excessive worry and unjustified behavioral changes." That was my Sunday. The picture was vivid enough that "how likely is this?" never came up until I caught it.

Easter's sentence points toward a second effect, and it matters if your company has had a quiet year. The closest match I found doesn't test his theory directly. In 2018, David Levari, Daniel Gilbert and colleagues reported in Science that when the thing people were looking for became rare, they widened their definition of it. When blue dots became rare, people began calling purple dots blue. When threatening faces became rare, people began to see neutral faces as threatening, and when unethical requests became rare, innocuous requests began to look unethical. Warning people didn't stop it, and neither did telling them to stay consistent and paying them to do it. Their experiments were lab tasks with Harvard students, so taking it into a company is my extension, not their finding. Still, picture a company coming off a quiet year. A late shipment or one sharp customer email gets a meeting it would never have rated in a bad year. Nothing got worse, but the bar moved.

Knowing about the bias, and being told to resist it, didn't remove it in either set of studies. Good intentions are a weak defense. A short procedure you run on purpose is stronger.

How do you size a fear?

You find the number first. For my Sunday, I used the FBI's own count of rare attacks like that one. From 2021 through 2025, the FBI recorded 217 of them in the United States, and 382 people were killed.

The FBI doesn't publish odds, so this is our math, not theirs. By our calculation on the FBI's 2021 through 2025 counts, 382 deaths over five years spread across the U.S. population, the chance works out to about 1 in 4.5 million in a given year and about 1 in 57,000 over a lifetime. Other counts run higher because they use wider definitions. For scale, the National Safety Council's "Odds of Dying" page puts the lifetime odds of dying in a motor vehicle crash at about 1 in 100 (1 in 101), based on 2024 data. Next to our figure, a lifetime on the road carries more than 500 times the risk.

I drove to church that Sunday, and the drive was the bigger risk, one my mind never noticed.

Every one of those numbers is a person. Odds describe a country, and they say nothing to the people on the wrong end of them. The point is not that the fear is silly. The point is where my attention should go.

What does misplaced fear cost a leader?

Sunstein's opening scene has a price tag, and the risk researcher Gerd Gigerenzer put a number on it. After September 11, many Americans flew less and drove more. In a 2006 paper in Risk Analysis, he estimated that nearly 1,600 additional Americans died on the road in the year that followed. That is a modeled estimate from traffic data, not a count of individual deaths, but the lesson holds: the fear went to the vivid risk, and the ordinary one did the damage.

In a company the cost is smaller and the shape is the same. Attention goes to the vivid risk while the ordinary one goes unwatched.

Does your team catch your fear?

Misplaced fear does not stay in one head. Your team reads your state before it hears your words. In 2002, Sigal Barsade ran a study in which a trained actor sat in each group with a pleasant or unpleasant mood. Group members' moods moved with the actor's, and the groups that caught the good mood cooperated more and argued less. In 2005, Thomas Sy, Stéphane Côté and Richard Saavedra tested the leader's mood directly. Groups with a leader in a bad mood felt more negative and coordinated worse. Both studies used students in lab groups, not executives.

My Sunday had the same shape. My wife was standing right next to me. State is shared, so the first job in a high-pressure room is yours, and it comes before the first slide. When you're the person the board looks to, the fear you carry is the fear you hand out.

Isn't it irresponsible not to plan for the worst?

It would be, and preparing is part of leading well. Wanting to protect my wife is a good instinct, and knowing where the exits are is a habit I picked up from people who run toward danger for a living.

The difference is how the thinking starts. Noting the exits once, calmly, when I walk into a room is preparation. A full scenario that starts running by itself in the middle of worship, before anyone has asked how likely it is, is my mind hunting. The first one serves me. The second one runs me.

The Fear Check in three steps

1. Say it. I put the threat in one plain sentence. Mine was a rare attack, in a crowded room. A sentence can be checked, and a picture can't.

2. Size it. I find one number from a source with no reason to scare me, and set it next to a risk I already take without a second thought. In a company, that source is your own data, like the retention report, the pipeline or the incident log, not the loudest voice in the meeting. If you can't find a number, you are still working from a picture, so finding one comes before acting.

3. Steer it. Hands open. It works like the safety briefing before a flight. Where are the exits? What's my responsibility? Check. Now, engage in the moment, and let your attention go back to what matters. If the number says rare, that quick check is all the fear gets. If the number says real and large, prepare once, calmly, and let the plan stand.

Why hands. The hands are how you run that third step in the moment. A clenched fist is closing up, so I coach clients to turn their hands over, palms up and open, and leave them there while they run the check. Marsha Linehan teaches it in dialectical behavior therapy as willing hands, and her handout describes unclenching the hands and turning the palms up with the fingers relaxed. That one comes from clinical practice and my own coaching, not from a lab, and I found no study that tests palms-up hands on their own, so I offer it as a coaching practice, not a proven fix.

My Sunday, start to finish. Say it: a rare attack, in a crowded room. Size it: about 1 in 57,000 over a lifetime (our math on the FBI's 2021 through 2025 counts), against about 1 in 100 (1 in 101) for dying in a car crash (National Safety Council, 2024 data). Steer it: hands open, where are the exits? What's my responsibility? Check. Now, engage in the moment.

A made-up example with nobody real in it. It's the night before a board presentation, and a leader keeps rehearsing one hostile question that probably won't come. Say it: a director is going to ask the hard one, and I'll freeze. Size it: how many board meetings in the last two years actually included a question like that? Check your own record. Steer it: prepare one answer, once, calmly. Then walk in with your hands open, and if the hard question does land, leave them open and put your attention on everyone at the table. Braced, you wait for one question. Present, you hear everyone at the table.

Catching it that Sunday was the skill. The Fear Check gives that skill steps. The goal isn't less fear. It's fear pointed at what's real. The next time a fear takes over your week, say it, size it, steer it, and then get back to the work that matters. The next time your mind starts planning for the worst, ask one question first: Is this fear worth my attention?

Get the Field Guides

Free and instant. The Team guide just asks for your first name and email. The Fear Check is a tool I built from the research discussed in the episode. It is not a clinical protocol.

  • The Fear Check Field Guide

    Two pages. A wall-ready poster of the three steps, hands open included, then a worksheet with a short self-audit, a fear-and-number table, three drills, two worked examples and a seven-day tracker.

    Download the Field Guide (PDF)
  • The Fear Check for Teams

    Two pages for a leadership team. The same poster, then a worksheet for running say it, size it, steer it together in a pre-board or pre-crisis meeting, starting with hands open. It has a team self-audit, three team drills, a board-prep example and a seven-day team tracker.

    Add your first name and email and the Team guide downloads right away.

    Free. First name and email only. Unsubscribe anytime.

Episodes mentioned

  • The Antagonist Test (episode 303): the last episode caught the worst story about the person across the table. This one is the worst story about the world.

Questions about catastrophizing and fear

What is the Fear Check?

It is a three-step tool I built from the research in this episode: say it, size it, steer it. You write the fear as one plain sentence, find one number from a source with no reason to scare you, then run a quick safety briefing with your hands open and put your attention back on what is real.

How do I stop catastrophizing as a leader?

Don't try to out-argue the picture. Run a short procedure on purpose. Write the fear in one sentence, size it against a number and an everyday risk, then turn your hands over, palms up and open, ask where the exits are and what your responsibility is, and move on. In the studies behind this episode, knowing about the bias and being told to resist it was not enough.

How do I know if a fear deserves my attention?

Ask whether it is worth your attention. If the number says rare, the quick check is all the fear gets, and your attention goes back to what matters. If the number says real and large, prepare once, calmly, and let the plan stand. If you can't find a number, you are still working from a picture.

Is it wrong to plan for rare events?

No. Preparing is part of leading well. Noting the exits once, calmly, is preparation. A scenario that runs on its own before anyone has asked how likely it is, is your mind hunting.

Does a leader's fear spread to the team?

Lab studies suggest moods spread in groups, and that a leader's mood shapes the group's tone and coordination. Those studies used students, not executives, so treat the finding as a strong reason to manage your own state first, not as a guarantee.

Is this a substitute for professional help?

No. This episode is about leadership and risk perception. It isn't medical advice, and anyone struggling with anxiety should talk to a qualified professional.

Sources

  1. Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman and Combs, "Judged Frequency of Lethal Events," Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 1978.
  2. Sunstein, "Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law," Yale Law Journal 112(1), October 2002, pp. 61-107. https://doi.org/10.2307/1562234
  3. Goode, "Rational and Irrational Fears Combine in Terrorism's Wake," The New York Times, October 2, 2001, p. F1 (the passage Sunstein quotes at the start of his essay, his note 3).
  4. Easter, "Fear is Good," Two Percent with Michael Easter, October 26, 2026. https://www.twopct.com/p/fear-is-good
  5. Levari, Gilbert, Wilson, Sievers, Amodio and Wheatley, "Prevalence-induced concept change in human judgment," Science, 2018.
  6. Gigerenzer, "Out of the Frying Pan into the Fire: Behavioral Reactions to Terrorist Attacks," Risk Analysis, 2006.
  7. Barsade, "The Ripple Effect: Emotional Contagion and Its Influence on Group Behavior," Administrative Science Quarterly, 2002.
  8. Sy, Côté and Saavedra, "The Contagious Leader: Impact of the Leader's Mood on the Mood of Group Members, Group Affective Tone, and Group Processes," Journal of Applied Psychology, 2005.
  9. Linehan, DBT Skills Training Handouts and Worksheets, 2nd ed. (Guilford Press, 2015), Distress Tolerance Handouts 14, "Half-Smiling and Willing Hands," and 14A, "Practicing Half-Smiling and Willing Hands."
  10. FBI, "Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2025." (five-year summary, 2021 through 2025; the FBI publishes counts, not odds)
  11. National Safety Council, Injury Facts, "Odds of Dying," 2024 data: lifetime odds of dying in a motor vehicle crash, 1 in 101. https://injuryfacts.nsc.org/all-injuries/preventable-death-overview/odds-of-dying/
  12. U.S. Census Bureau, population estimate, July 1, 2025; CDC National Center for Health Statistics, life expectancy at birth, 2024 (79.0 years). Both are inputs to our odds math.

Notes on the evidence

  • Methods, our calculation (not the FBI's and not the National Safety Council's): FBI 2021 through 2025, 382 killed, which is 76.4 a year. U.S. population, 341,784,857 (Census Bureau estimate, July 1, 2025) divided by 76.4 is about 4.47 million, so about 1 in 4.5 million in a given year. Divided by 79.0 years of life expectancy (CDC/NCHS, 2024) it is about 56,600, which we round to about 1 in 57,000 over a lifetime. It is an all-population average, not any one person's chance. The FBI reports 217 incidents and 382 killed in that period but publishes no odds.
  • The 1 in 101 figure is the National Safety Council's, from its "Odds of Dying" page, 2024 data, and is a separate figure from ours. The "more than 500 times" comparison is our own arithmetic: about 57,000 divided by 101 is about 560.
  • The nearly 1,600 figure is Gigerenzer's modeled estimate (about 1,595 in his paper), not a count.
  • Barsade, Sy and colleagues, and Levari used student samples in lab tasks. The Levari faces and requests findings, and that people kept the effect when warned and paid to resist it, are from the paper's abstract. Applying them to companies is my extension.
  • Sunstein's opening scene is a passage from Erica Goode's New York Times article, which he quotes at the start of his essay. The Sunstein quotations on this page come from the Yale Law Journal text, "excessive worry and unjustified behavioral changes" on p. 63 and "do not give sufficient consideration to the likelihood that the worst case will actually occur" on p. 67.
  • Easter calls the over-index idea "one theory" and says he will return to it, so I use it as his framing and not as an established finding. The Levari paper is the closest match I found, and it does not test his theory.
  • Willing hands is a distress-tolerance skill in DBT. I found no study that tests palms-up hands on their own.
  • The Linehan handout wording was checked against a third-party copy of the handout, not Guilford's own PDF, so the page describes it in general terms.